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Judge-Jury -Counsel Relations
in Kentucky
By JomN E. KENNEDY*
Editor's Note: The following article is based upon a report of the 1964
seminar for Kentucky Circuit Judges sponsored by the Joint Com-
mittee for the Effective Administration of Justice, American Bar
Center, Chicago. This part of the seminar was chaired by Honorable
George B. Richter, Judge of the Thirteenth Judicial Court of Iowa,
Waukon, Iowa. For reports of the other seminars, see Volz, Court
Administration, and Thompson, Control Over Demonstrative Evidence,
29 Ky. Bar. 1. 89, 44 (Jan. 1965).
I. Introduction
Judge Richter defined the seminar's initial purpose to be
the search for ways of improving the image of justice as observed
through the eyes of the jury. The discussion was therefore di-
rected toward methods of handling the attorneys and the jury
during pretrial, trial, and post-trial settings. The second purpose
of this seminar was to examine the judges' role in politics and
the relation of this role to improved standards of justice.
II. Pretrial Orientation of Jurors
A) The Summons
The first identifiable contact of the prospective juror with
the court is the summoning of the person for jury duty. Under
the provisions of Ky. Rev. Stat. 29.135 sixty summonses may be
issued and a panel of thirty-two persons may be seated. There is
no state-wide jury information book in use. Only one judge,
Robert 0. Lukowsky, of the Kenton Circuit Court reported
using a jury guide book which he attaches to the initial summons.
He reported a practical advantage is that this guide book tends to
eliminate telephone calls by prospective jurors to the clerk of
court or to the judge himself. These telephone calls typically ask
for routine information or exemptions. The book also has the
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky.
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good effect of anticipating some of the usual excuses for not
serving on the jury and disposes of them in a neutral manner
without provoking personal animosity toward the judge for re-
fusing to grant jury exemptions. In a positive vein, the booklet
often gets the prospective juror interested in service and thus
overcomes his reluctance to serve. Judge Lukowski felt that it is
all-important to induce the ordinary citizen to serve on juries and
not to grant exemptions loosely. Otherwise the process has a
tendency to backslide and result in a group of professional court-
house jurors.
B) The Surroundings
The second set of details for the judge to focus upon relates
to the sensory perceptions of the juror as he first appears in the
courthouse. It was suggested that it might be desirable to hang
framed reproductions of the juryman's creed on the walls outside
the courtroom, or to post other symbols about the ideals of
justice. All judges reported having a United States flag and a
State flag behind the bench. Some judges reported extremely
antiquated physical facilities and that until new courtrooms could
be constructed it would be difficult to upgrade the formality of
the courtroom. If a new courtroom is being planned it was
pointed out that it is important to investigate some of the new
design arrangements that have developed to allow the jury, the
judge and the attorneys to function at maximum efficiency and
to accommodate scientific demonstrative evidence such as movie
films, tape recorders, view boxes, microphones-rather than auto-
matically allowing the design of a courtroom to be made in an
unfunctional style. An example of possible new designs is the
courtroom with the judge's bench located diagonally across a
corner. The judge at least has the responsibility in the planning
of new courtroom facilities to see that future generations do not
become saddled with designs that are already out-moded when
built.
Of the judges present when a poll was taken, twelve judges fol-
lowed the practice of not wearing judicial robes, while twenty-five
judges did wear robes. Those not wearing robes were generally of
the opinion that they did not wish to begin this observance on
their own motion, but they would be in favor of it if the Court
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of Appeals made a rule to that effect or if the local or state bar
association passed a resolution. They also felt that the robes
should be paid for out of an appropriation by the County Fiscal
Court. The general consensus was that the wearing of judicial
robes was an important aspect of raising the level of respect for
the judge and justice.
The poll of the judges failed to indicate any uniform rules as
to whether smoking was allowed in their courtrooms, whether
certain standards of dress were required of the attorneys, parties
and spectators, or whether they had specific rules requiring at-
torneys to stand when addressing the bench. There was general
agreement that these matters could stand some general upgrading.
In handling the psychological strategy of this upgrading, one
judge reported he had adopted a rule that lawyers sixty-five years
of age and under must wear ties. The net effect was that none of
the older lawyers would admit to being over sixty-five and the
others readily complied with the good feeling that they were still
young men.
C) The Initial Orientation
Once the prospective jurors have been assembled in the court-
room, additional impressions are made. All judges reported a for-
mal opening of the court by the bailiff, and all reported giving an
orientation to the jury, some lasting from two to three minutes,
on the theory that this is all that is necessary. Others reported
orientations lasting up to thirty or thirty-five minutes. The sub-
ject matter of these orientations vary greatly. Typically, however,
they cover such things as the physical facilities and lavatories
available, what will be expected of the jurors, how long they will
have to serve, and how much they will be paid. Some judges also
give a series of cautionary instructions about not talking with the
witnesses or the attorneys during the trials and against talking
with each other about the cases until they meet for final delibera-
tions. Other judges gave specific instructions on subjects in which
they had experienced difficulty in the past, e.g. an instruction
against quotient verdicts. In response to a description of the
Indiana procedure of giving standardized preliminary instructions
to the jury, there was a general feeling among the Kentucky Cir-
cuit judges that under present practice they were not allowed on
1966]
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their own motion to give preliminary instructions. They were
not aware of any movement to copy the Indiana practice.'
D) The Voir Dire: Mechanics
The Kentucky practice, which follows the federal rules,
presumably would allow the trial judge to conduct the voir dire
to the exclusion of the trial attorneys, with the attorneys being
forced to make specific requests to the judge for him to ask
questions of the jurors. However the overwhelming sentiment
and philosophy of the judges was to "let the lawyers try the case."
Most of the judges do ask some preliminary questions of the jury
and then turn the voir dire over to the attorneys. Generally they
require the lawyers to address the panel as a whole in civil cases,
but do not in criminal cases. The judges stated that they control
the voir dire at all times under the primary test of whether the
lawyer's conduct is consuming an undue amount of time. The
general observation was that the Kentucky attorneys did not abuse
the voir dire by lengthy questioning. The idea was promoted that
formal biographical questionnaires should be filled out in advance
by each prospective juror and should be made available to the
lawyers in order to eliminate some of the questioning on voir
dire. A poll of the judges indicated that none were following this
procedure, though some judges have their clerks fill in basic
bigoraphical data for use by the attorneys. It seems to be an un-
known factor the degree to which prospective jurors' backgrounds
and privacy are subjected to scrutiny by professional investigators
who report their findings to the attorneys. The overall question
was posed as to what effect these practices might have upon the
jurors' attitude toward the judge, attorneys and parties to a law
suit. To the extent that this is or may become a problem, forma-
lized questionnaires may help in minimizing it.
E) Voir Dire: Content of Questions
As to the proper limitations upon the content of questions
that could be asked upon voir dire, there was no substantial agree-
I A strong plea for better informed juries through jury books and preliminary
instructions is made by Judge Earl E. O'Conner, in The Right to Trial by an
Ignorant Jury, 3 Trial Judges' Journal (July 1964). Some cases dealing with the
objections that must be overcome are United States v. Gordon, 196 F.2d 886 (7th
Cir. 1952), vacated 253 F.2d 177 (1958); People v. Izzo, 14 111.2d 203, 151
N.E.2d 329 (1958); People v. Schoos, 399 Il1. 527, 78 N.E.2d 245, 2 A.L.R.2d
1096 (1948).
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ment. The general sentiment however seemed to run in favor of,
the Illinois rule prohibiting questions on specific elements of law
or evidence to be adduced in the case, though some dissented
from this view. Again there was substantial agreement against
allowing what was termed "Belli-type questions." However, when
confronted with a concrete case, the judges were divided as to the
properiety of voir dire questioning of the juror about his feelings
toward the proper amount of damages. This question was posed
in the 1963 West Virginia case of Thornsbury v. Thornsbury,2
where in an automobile case for wrongful death, plaintiff's coun-
sel propounded to the jury this question: "Should the evidence
disclose to you and you should be of the opinion that the plaintiffs
are entitled to win, entitled to recovery, do you feel that 25,000
dollars is too much for the death of a sixteen year old girl?" The
trial court refused to allow the question and the appellate court
affirmed it on this point on the theory that the question made no
contribution to accomplishing a fair trial or to the proper admin-
istration of justice.
The 1954 federal case of Terminal Transport Co. v. Berry3,
fairly well restates Kentucky law as to prejudice in raising the
fact that the defendant is insured. The court there asserts that
under Kentucky law in personal injury actions, it is prejudicial
error to permit plaintiff to place before the jury the fact that the
defendant carried indemnity insurance and judgement will be set
aside where it appears that such facts are intentionally injected in
a manner evidencing bad faith. On the other hand, when the
existence of such indemnity insurance is inadvertently injected
into the case in the absence of bad faith, with no purpose to pro-
fit thereby, the error will be regarded as not prejudicial. The
court thus refused to reverse when one of the plaintiff's witnesses
gratuitously referred to the defendant's "insurance man". Hall
v. Ratliffi, and Herald v. Gross5, represent the two most recent
application of these rules. In the first case, it was reversible error
for the plaintiff's attorney to pursue cross examination as to state-
2 131 S.E.2d 713, 720 (W.Va. 1963).
3 217 F.2d 32 (6th Cir. 1954). Caveat, a recent decision has held that a
state's restrictive practice on voir dire is no bar to federal court inquiry into
prospective juror's connection with insurance companies. Kiernan v. Van Schalk,
847 F.2d 775 (3r Cir. 1965).
4312 S.W.2d 473 (Ky. 1958).
G 343 S.W.2d 831 (Ky. 1961).
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ments made by the defendant that he was insured, whereas in the
second case it was not a basis for a mistrial for the plaintiff's
doctor to state inadvertently he had sent a claim for services to
the insurance company.
The application of these standards is the same in relation to
questioning the prospective juror on the voir dire examination.
Thus if an attorney in good faith pursues questioning as to a
prospective juror's business relationship with the defendant and
does not bring in unnecessary references to liability insurance,
there is no prejudicial error if the subject of insurance is
mentioned.6
III. Conduct of the Trial
A) Control of the Attorneys
During the course of the trial the judge is continuously af-
fecting the jury's impression of justice. The manner in which the
judge reprimands counsel, in which he demands respect from the
attorneys, and in which he makes rulings-in short, his total
actions and inactions in controlling the course of the trial are
important in improving the jury's respect for justice.
Probably the most important index of this respect is the
integrity of the relationship between the judge and the attorneys.
Since the judge has a prime responsibility in enforcing the lawyers'
code of professional responsibility7, every question involving the
control of the attorney's conduct during the course of a trial is a
legal one, but it should also be given added consideration from
the viewpoint of the psychological impact on the jury.
B) Control of the Jury
Some features of jury control may appear to be irrational in
the eyes of the jury unless some explanation is made by the judge.
For example in Gipson v. Commonwealths, one familiar ground
of a claim for new trial was that after submission of the case a
6 Compare Bourland v. Mitchell, 835 S.W.2d 567 (Ky. 1960), with Potter
v. Trent, 262 S.W.2d 186, 187 (1958), where it was prejudicial error to examine
insurance salesmen as to whether they sold auto liability insurance, when the fact
was already within the knowledge of counsel.7 See, e.q., College of Trial Lawyers Code of Trial Conduct, 43 A.B.A.J.
223-26 (1957).
8133 Ky. 398, 118 S.W. 834 (1909).
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juror took it upon himself to reduce to writing the testimony of
each witness, which writing it is claimed was used by the jury in
arriving at a verdict. The opinion states that it appears that the
writing was made in the presence of all the members of the jury,
and in the absence of proof to the contrary, must be presumed to
have been the joint production of all, though actually written by
only one of their number. The writing was not preserved, and
not being in the record, its accuracy could not be tested. The
court said: "we do not mean to commend such a practice, but it
does not appear to have been prejudicial in this case to the rights
of the appellant."9 In Miller v. Comm onwealth'1 the mere fact
that a juror had made some brief notes during the trial was not
a sufficient showing for a new trial. The Kentucky cases thus
seem to hold that while the taking of notes by the jury is not
commended, a reverasal will not result in the absence of some
showing of prejudice. The judges present at the seminar had
various attitudes towards the propriety of jurors taking notes;
some considered it a fairly serious ground for mistrial; most judges
generally stated they discouraged the practice; others stated that
they encouraged the practice of taking notes in fairly complicated
cases, such as condemnation awards, but that ordinarily they
obtained the consent of the attorneys in order to avoid possible
claims of minstrial. In any event, it was urged that when the
question arises, the judge should explain briefly why the jury is
not allowed to take notes."
Another question raised was the propriety of allowing the
jurors to question the witnesses. As a purely legal question the
resolution of the problem seems to be vested in the sound dis-
cretion of the trial judge. 12 The general consensus of the judges
on this point was that the judge should discourage the jury from
asking questions, but if they are allowed to, the judge should
screen the question first. On the basis of their own past experience
that the jury usually asks pertinent, valid questions, other judges
advocated free questioning by the jury.
D Id. at 336.
10 175 Ky. 241, 194 S.W. 320 (1917).
11 On jury note taking as a basis of mistrial, see Annot, 154 A.L.R. 878(1945).
12See United States v. Witt, 215 F.2d 580, 584 (2nd Cir. 1954).
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C) Control of the Witnesses
The problem of whether the judge should interrogate witnesses
and to what extent apparently is a more serious one. For purposes
of discussion, Judge Richter related the case of Ratton v. Busby.13
This case involved a five-day trial arising out of the collision of
two airplanes in their approach to landing. Witnesses who knew
and flew planes used vocabulary almost unknown to persons not
air-minded. In order to understand the testimony, the court asked
some 160 questions, and the jurors asked forty-five or more. There
was a verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendant sought a new
trial, claiming impropriety and prejudice because of the number
of questions propounded by the court and because the court in-
vited the jurors to ask questions of the witnesses while testifying.
On the second day of the trial, and before any objection had been
interposed, the court, on its own motion, told the jury that it was
asking questions simply for the purpose of determining the law
to be given to the jury and "as I have told you in the general
instructions at the time the general charge was given to the jury
panel, no question asked by the court is ever intended or meant
as a comment upon the testimony or credibility of any particular
witness .... 14, On the third day, defendant's counsel moved for
a mistrial. In the absence of the jury, the court then explained to
counsel:
The court is not trying to try your lawsuit. The court has some
obligation to see justice is done and jurors can intelligently
pass on the facts .... I am afraid you gentlemen are ovelook-
ing one thing: trial of a lawsuit is not a battle of wits. Trial
of a lawsuit in a court of justice is to arrive at justice, and that
is what the court is trying to do.' 5
Immediately thereafter, the judge in open court told the jury:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the court in the general
instructions at the time the entire jury panel was present in
court instructed the jury that from time to time the court
might ask questions, either for the purpose of determining the
law applicable to the case, the instructions to be given, or for
the purpose of clairfying something in the court's mind. The
3 326 S.W.2d 889 (Ark. 1959).
14Id. at 896.
15 Ibid.
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court in this case has asked a number of questions. The jury
is instructed and told at this time, as they were in the general
instructions, that no question asked by the court is intended
or meant as any comment upon the weight of the evidence or
the credibility of the witness. The jury is the sole and exclusive
judge of the evidence, of the weight thereof, and of the
credibility of the witnesses, and no question asked by the court
should be taken by the jury as any inference or comment by
the court in any manner on the testimony of any witness or
the credibility of any witness or the weight you should give
them.16
The Arkansas Supreme Court observed that the questions
asked by the trial judge were not objectionable as violating rules
of evidence, and that none of the questions, separately or col-
lectively, showed any view of the judge or the exertion of a
conscious or unconscious influence on the jury's verdict.
The opinion then quoted from an earlier criminal case,17
which stated that the judge has the right to interrogate witnesses
but not to usurp the place of the state's attorney or the defendant's
counsel. The opinion in this earlier case states, in part:
It would be a reproach to the laws of the state if [the judge]
was required to sit and see the guilty escape, or the innocent
suffer through a failure of parties or their attorneys to ask a
witness a necessary question.... In all trials the judge should
preside with impartiality. In jury trials especially, he ought
to be cautious and circumspect in his language and conduct
before the jury. He should not express or intimate an opinion
as to the credibility of a witness, or as to controverted
facts .... "I
The opinion of the three dissenting judges emphasizes a dif-
ferent aspect of the court-counsel relationship. It refers to the
reluctance of lawyers to take exceptions to the trial judge's actions
in interrogating witnesses, for fear of adverse reaction by the
judge. Further, when a fact is developed by questions asked by
the court, such fact carries far greater weight than if it had been
proved by testimony developed by counsel for the side helped by
16 Ibid.
17 Sharp v. State, 51 Ark. 147, 10 S.W. 228 (1889).
18 326 S.W.2d at 897.
KENTucKY LAw JotRNAL
the fact. Moreover, when the court asks a large number of
questions, there is extreme danger of one or more jurors getting
an impression from the questions asked and the facts thereby
developed, that the court has an opinion on the merits of the
case, when in fact the court has no such opinion. It was because
the dissenters thought this was the very thing that may have
happened in the case at bar that they felt a new trial should be
granted.
Referring, however, to the situations where the court aids a
lawyer who is young or inexperienced, the dissenting opinion
states:
This is not to say, however, that the court must sit quietly by
and see a miscarriage of justice take effect because a lawyer
on one side is completely outclassed by his adversary, nor does
it mean that the trial court should not aid a young and in-
experienced lawyer who needs help. From time immemorial it
has been the custom and practice of courts to take care of
situations of that kind. But where both sides are represented
by counsel of the caliber appearing in the case at bar, they
should be allowed to try their case and develop it according
to their own judgment, complying, of course, with the rules of
evidence.19
The judges present at the seminar showed a split in viewpoint
similar to that of the majority and dissenting opinions in the
Ratton case. The judges were, however, in substantial agreement
that the outer limits of the judge's propriety in interrogating
witnesses and commenting upon the evidence had been reached
in the case of Collins v. Sparks,20 when the judge's manner of
questioning a witness left the definite impression that the judge
did not believe the witness.
D) Presentation of the Law to the Jury
The seminar discussions also spent some time in examining
the methods by which jury instructions are formulated between
the attorneys and judge and are submitted to the jury. There was
substantial feeling that this area of Kentucky practice could be
improved. Judge Richter commented upon the Illinois and Ohio
projects for standardized jury instructions and Judge Prager, of
19 Id. at 900.20 310 S.W.2d 45 (Ky. 1958).
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the Kansas District Court, recounted the successful Kansas ex-
perience in promoting standardized jury instructions. A possibly
revolutionary approach was reported where, with the consent of
the attorneys in the case, the jury had been instructed simply to
"do right." It was felt that this process was much more satis-
factory to all concerned than the lengthy elaboration of over-
complicated jury instructions which the jury did not seem to
comprehend anyway.
E) Jury Deliberations
Other problems raised were those connected with keeping a
jury together overnight and, on the other hand, the necessary
cautionary instructions and supervision in allowing the jury to
separate both overnight and during recesses in the trial. There
seemed to be a reluctance to utilize the full power that the trial
judge may have in giving further instructions calculated to break
a hung jury. Typical of these is the so-called "Allen" or "dyna-
mite" charge approved in the case of Allen v. United States.21
Two old Kentucky cases apparently would allow the Kentucky
trial judge to go fairly far in attempting to break a deadlock. In
City of Covington v. Bostwick,22 an instruction was given in sub-
stance that the issue must be decided by this jury or another
jury and that, if they did not decide it, it would cause expense
to the parties and to the Commonwealth and that, though the
jurymen should not sacrifice their consciences; they shculd en-
deavor to come to agreement, but that the court did not mean to
attempt to force the jury to agree. This was held not to be an
objectionable instruction. Similarly in Monroe v. Brann,23 the
court held it was not an abuse of discretion to keep the jury to-
gether a day and a half after they reported they could not agree;
and to instruct the jury, saying "the parties are entitled to a
verdict" and that the jury should "exhaust all reasonable means
in order to find a verdict." A version of the "Allen" charge which
had been used in some cases but never tested by the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky was, in substance, the telling of the story of
the two billy goats in Aesops Fables who met head-on coming
around a narrow mountain trail and proceeded to butt their
21 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
2226 Ky. L. Rep. 780, 82 S.W. 569 (1904).
23 14 Ky.L.Rep. 764 (1893).
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heads together until they both fell off the mountain. The moral
of the story was that if the billy goats had stopped for a minute,
stepped back and looked around, they could have observed that
there was a pathway wide enough for both of them to pass by.
Whether this instruction could survive the Kentucky Court of
Appeals was up for speculation.
In all of the problems dealing with jury management arising
after the jury had retired to the juryroom the judges agreed it
is good practice to confer with both attorneys in an attempt to
obtain their consent as to any action the judge might take in
order to eliminate questions of mistrial. In summary, as to the
ultimate objective of maintaining a high image of justice in the
eyes of the jury, all judges stressed the importance of making
rational explanations to the jury of the reasons underlying pro-
cedural technicalities occurring during trial.
IV. Post-trial Settings
Judge Richter focused the discussion upon a policy conflict
in the judge's supervision of the attorneys' contact with the jury
once the verdict has been rendered. On one hand, all the judges
assumed that it was improper conduct on the part of an attorney
to harass members of the jury with phone calls after the trial
in an attempt to turn up evidence of jury miconduct. The judges
commented that the only direct remedy for this conduct occurred
when a jury member would make a complaint to the judge and
then the judge would call up the attorney and reprimand him. It
is true that the rules of law which allow a new trial on the basis of
jury misconduct are fairly restrictive, and thus indirectly inhibit
the attorneys from post-trial jury harassment. Nevertheless, the
exceptions to these rules contemplate that the attorneys will con-
tact the jurors to determine the nature of the misconduct if it
took place. The canons of ethics in fact recognize this right of the
attorney. For example, the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Drury
v. Franke,2 4 recognized the general rule that a verdict cannot be
impeached by the testimony of jurors. Nevertheless, the plaintiff
was able to upset the verdict on the basis that four of the jurors
on voir dire examination had failed to answer truthfully and af-
firmatively to a question whether they had ever been involved in
24247 Ky. 728, 57 S.W.2d 969 (1933).
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an automobile collision. The method of proving the answers
false was the taking of statements from the jury members after
the trial. This conflict between the interest of the jury in being
left alone once the trial had ended and the interest of the at-
torneys in protecting themselves against improper jury conduct
has in Kentucky apparently been resolved in favor of allowing
the attorneys to go after the facts without much regulation other
than the rule disallowing impeachment of the jury verdict by
testimony of the jurors. Another version of the same technique
was noted by one judge who commented that frequently attorneys
for prison inmates eligible for parole were visiting the families
of the victims involved in the crime and obtaining statements
that they were in favor of the parole. These statements are then
submitted to the parole board.
While all the Kentucky judges felt that it would be unwise
for the trial judge to attempt to regulate the attorney's conduct
outside of the courtroom without some further guidelines, most
judges agreed that it would be a good idea for the judge to
exercise his power over the conduct of attorneys in the courtroom.
This can be done by a standing court rule,25 or by a standardized
oral instruction delivered as the jury returns to the courtroom to
the effect that it is not permissible for the parties to shake hands
with or to congratulate the jury or in any other manner express
approval or disapproval of the jury's verdict and that the attorneys
are similarly restrained from talking to the jury while they are
still in the courtroom.26
2 Rule 18 of the Second Judicial District of Iowa provides:
No attorney or party litigant who has taken any part in or has been
any party to any litigation in any of the Courts of the Second Judicial
District of Iowa shall, in the court room, express any thanks, gratitude
or dissatisfaction to either the Court or the jury, or offer to shake hands
with any member of any jury, or the Court upon rendition of a verdict
or the announcement of the decision in any action tried and determined
before such Court; nor shall any such attorney or party litigant incite,
or by Court upon rendition of a verdict or the announcement of the
decision in any action tried and determined before such Court; nor
shall any such attorney or party litigant incite, or by action or word
cause any demonstration of any kind in the court room relative to any
ruling of the Court or verdict of the jury in any case tried, or being
tried, in any such Court. All attorneys shall admonish their clients before
the trial of such case of this Rule. A violation of this Rule of Formality
may, in the discretion of the Court, render any such offending party
liable to be adjudged in contempt of Court.
26 Suggested samnie instruction:
APPEARANCES: All parties, counsel, and jury present.
(Continued on next page)
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V. The Judge's Role in Politics
Shifting from the courtroom setting to the judge's role in the
community as a whole, Judge Richter posed the problem of how
to lift the judge out of politics in order to improve the quality of
his administration of justice and to increase the respect which the
public holds for the law and the judge's office. Judicial canons
28 and 30 of the Canons of Professional and Judicial Ethics of the
American Bar Association were the subject of discussion as in-
terpreted by opinion 113 of the Committee on Professional Ethics
and Grievances. Canon 28 provides in effect that a judge, as part
of his obligation not to engage in partisan politics, should not
appear at political meetings and indicate his support of candidates
for office, nor act as a party treasurer. Opinion 226 interpreting
canon 30, concerns the question whether it is proper for an in-
cumbent judge to accept contributions from lawyers for a judicial
campaign. This opinion states that while lawyers may contribute
to a campaign fund of judges whose election they honestly favor,
such contribution should in every case be reasonable, and pre-
ferably be made as a contribution to a campaign committee. A
further opinion on this point in the American Bar Association
Journal was reported as stating that a judge should not himself
make contributions to political campaigns and should not attend
political meetings unless he is a candidate for office during that
election.
The results presented in these opinions were subjected to
some amount of criticism as applied to the Kentucky scene. The
criticisms were that while the principles might represent nice
ideals, Kentucky had always been governed by what was called
"Mulligans Rule" to the effect that "politics in Kentucky are
the damnedest." The critics pointed out that it was unreal to
suppose that a judge could faithfully follow canon 28 and not
(Footnotes continued from preceding page)
THE COURT: The Court is informed that the jury is ready to return
its verdict. I wish to state that it is not permissible for the parties to
shake bands with or congratulate the jury, or in any other manner ex-
press approval or disapproval of the jury's verdict. The jury is only
oing its duty. I ask the foreman of the jury, Mr ......................................
if you have agreed upon a verdict.
For additional suggestions, see Cbristenson. Courtroom Decorum as an Aid to
Proper Judicial Administration, 27 F.R.D. 445, 460 (1961).
[Vol. 54,
JuDGE-JuRY-COUNsEL RELATIOS
engage in politics nor make contributions during his off years
and then turn around and expect the political party to support
him when he was running for office. The theory would be alright,
in other words, if the county campaign chairmans could be in-
duced to believe in the rule also. The issue was posed whether a
judge ought to sit on the platform with, for example, presidential
candidates when they come to town. This drew a strong dif-
ference of opinion from the Kentucky judges. A similar division
of opinion ran to the question whether the judge ought to serve
as a bank director and to what extent all activities forbidden to
the judge could ethically be carried on by his wife.
Although there was a minority of judges favoring a philosophy
that it was a good thing to keep the judge in politics and thus
make him responsive to the will of the people, the majority con-
sensus was that the ideals of attempting to remove the judge from
partisan politics were the proper goals to be sought. All of them
generally agreed that the abstract Canons of Judicial Ethics had
serious shortcomings since they did not take cognizance of local
election practice and custom. The judges were of substantial
agreement that great reform could come only through complete
revision of the judicial article rather than through piecemeal
attempts to upgrade the system. Justice Richter reported Iowa's
recent experience in moving over to the system in which each
judge "runs against his record." That is, the voters vote "yes"
or "no" to the question "Should Judge X be retained in office?"
If the response of the voters is "no," then various screening com-
mittees go through a farily elaborate procedure to come up with
candidates for the office. Judge Richter's comments were that
Iowa's experience with this system had been very good to date.
Before adjournment, the Kentucky judges voiced special ap-
preciation for Judge Richter's lively and informed leadership of
this seminar.
VI. Conclusion
The seminar discussions of the above subjects produced two
general responses: First, the judges developed an awareness that
the passage of jurors through the courthouse has a feedback im-
pact on the public's sense of justice, and that the judge has a
19661
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continuing, conscious duty to see that this process is improved.
Second, a general consensus was reached that the idea of remov-
ing the judge from political interest is desirable, but that this
goal would remain impractical until a general reform of the
judicial articles of the Kentucky Constitution is accomplished.
